delighted [chuckles] for various reasons that an Iranian will appreciate. When we three actually asked to go have lunch with him he was delighted. He was quite a nice man, incidently. He was just a Lor who had a very different attitude towards the shedding of human blood and the mutilation of human flesh to the attitude that might be shared by you and me, for he was a tribesman -- a Lor.

We went to his house for lunch. And it was all spread out. It was a delicious buffet. And we talked about this and that and we'd rehearsed how we were going to operate. We had decided that we would mention the tortures to him and world opinion -- how horrified world opinion would be if it knew what was going on. And I decided that we must pinpoint -- focus -- on one particular example so that nothing should be diffused -- things shouldn't be lost in generalities.

And so in the course of the lunch I said, "Oh, by the way, Teymur Khan, "yek so'ali daram, ejaze mifarma'id." I went on. "The point of the matter -- One question is a matter that causes me a great deal of perturbation because my Iranian friends [are] always coming and talking to me about it and it really is so dreadful that I can't believe it. They must be lying to me. "Labod dorugh migand" -- must be lying, can't be true. Because, of course, if it were true (and I wrote about it in English newspapers) the name of Iran would become mud.

I mean, people would say, 'What kind of a country is Iran?' You know, 'the torture house', 'the channel house', 'dreadful place' -- World opinion would view it with such horror."

I said, "It can't really be true, can it, that you have a bear -- that you put young male and female prisoners in a cage with to frighten them?"

And Teymur Bakhtiyar thought for a moment. He said, "Wait a minute. There was a bear. There was an officer -- "

This is the naivete -- the simplicity of this Khan who was also a General and head of security organization.

He said, "Yes. An officer had a cub bear that he found in the Zagros Mountains once. It got big and it got rather a nuisance and he was going to shoot it. And I said 'Oh, don't shoot it. We might be able to use it.'"

I said, "What, Excellency? "Che mifarma'id?"

But he said, "I think it was only used once or twice."
But I said, "Once or twice is once or twice too many."

And then, as we planned it, Tamaddonolmolk Sajjadi and Mohammad Baqer came in and said, you see, "Yes. As Mr. Avery says, you see, this would create a terrible impression abroad" and so on.

And then we went into the whole question of torture trying to convince him like the three friends of his that we were -- the three teaching, guiding, advising, schoolmastering friends. We went into the whole business of torture to explain to him that for various people in foreign countries and in Europe and America this kind of thing was terrible. And it haunted and distressed people's imaginations and minds, you see.

And at the end of the lunch he said, "Well I must thank you very much. I'll stop this."

I did ask one question because there was always the question that all of us wanted to know the answer to. I said, "Does he know?" He, of course, being the Shah. I said, "Does he know?"

He said, "No. He doesn't know in detail. Of course, he doesn't know the details of what goes on. What he tells me to do is, 'Pedareshun-o dar biyarid'" -- which is the Persian idiom for, roughly, "give them hell". That's the nearest English equivalent I can think of.

"So the Shah says to me, 'Yes. Give them hell.' Though the actual details of how it's done, of course, he doesn't worry about."

The point here is that if the Shah tells a Lor Khan to give people hell, he must know what that could mean. That's the point.

Anyway, I do believe that at that luncheon party in 1955 -- it was in 1955 -- I think I might say that we did probably strike a blow for what subsequently has come to be called human rights. Because I was able, to some extent, to monitor afterwards the situation. And there was evidence that he did give instructions and that things were very much ameliorated after that lunch.

Q: The sad thing is that while McCarthyism was rather mild compared to what you have just described, and a temporary abberation, the spirit of McCarthyism in countries that were under the influence of American lingered on.

Avery: Lingered on. Yes, it did linger on.

Q: And it was much more savage, as you say.

Avery: Yes. I, of course, personally am one of those who don't believe that McCarthyism is particularly mild, either, in the United States. But, you're quite right. It did (I think) linger on. Of course, it may -- I don't know. I'm not speaking as an expert in international affairs. I don't know. Perhaps it appeared to some well-meaning people as being necessary at the time -- that the Russians were so dishonest and so little to be trusted that the risk of their using innocent, naive people to infiltrate capitalist societies might have been a very high one. I guess it was.

But I still believe that the United States was led into a terrible betrayal of Western standards of democtratic freedom and so on. And particularly any kind of U.S. or any other Western governments' acquiescence or even worse -- encouragement -- of some of the things that happened in a country like Iran during the Shah's regime in this respect of torment and torture of political dissidents and so on. This is an extremely grave departure from the expected norms of human behavior and a departure which is of the factors in the awful antipathy. Because what I'm really talking about in this stage of my reminiscences are the terrible antipathy that was gradually

built up from 1954 onwards against the Shah through this business of torture and what happened to those prisoners. It affected the middle and professional classes. News of it permeated all the classes of the country.

Q: And of course, got exaggerated -- Persians being what they are.

Avery: There was exaggeration.

I remember a British official in the British Embassy visiting my flat one evening. And I was so worried about this business. I remember saying to him that, "I suppose that a lot of it was lies spread by the Soviet Union because they wanted to destabilize the government in a country like Iran and to make it unpopular. Therefore, a lot of these stories that I'm told my Iranian friends must be exaggerations. Though, of course, some of my friends have showed me marks and showed me scars and evidence of what they've suffered. But many of the stories that I hear about what somebody else whom I don't in fact has suffered must be exaggerations."

And I remember as I said that -- half a statement, half a question -- to my friend, glancing at him and being surprised at seeing this normally very cool, collected, calm English diplomat as white as a ghost -- the blood drained from his face -- as white as a ghost.

And he said, "I'm very sorry to have to tell you that these stories are not exaggerations. They are not lies. They are not untruths. All the things your Iranian friends tell you do go on."

And of course, what I'm talking about then is the gradual creation, in those years, of what is called "boghz"-- "be, ghayn, zad" -- "boghz". Hatred, antagonism and antipathy towards the Shah.

If you get the small, green paperback, Hans Vess' Arabic Dictionary -- It's just next -- In those books there. There it is. It's a small, green paperback one. You had your finger on it. Look up this word.

Q: That's right.

Avery: It's a very strong word which many Iranians at that time began to use in my hearing.

Q: But there is another saying.

Avery: Was it with zod or did I spell it wrongly? Because it isn't a word where -- It's "boghz".

Q: It's "be, ghayn, zad".

Avery: Yes, it is. It's "be, ghayn, zad"--to be hated, hateful, odious, odium.

Q: Odium.

Avery: Many Iranians began to say to me (1955, 1956) -- It's this "boghz" that he is gradually building up against himself among the people by these episodes that I talked about like these tortures and so on.

Q: But you see, the awful thing is that in the modern world, torture has become a matter of course. And the truth of the matter is that it had never, ever in history helped any political purpose.

Avery: It never helped any purpose.

Q: I mean, the inquisition tortured everybody. Did it stop heresy, did it stop Protestantism?

Avery: No, it didn't.

Q: Did it stop Protestants from gaining ground? It never did.

Avery: The only result is an odium that is attached to the Roman Catholic Church ever since every time that word is mentioned.

Q: Ever since. And the same thing in Central America, the same thing is South America. Everywhere where torture has taken place it has been a prelude to a revolution, to disaster.

Avery: To disaster, to revolution.

Q: To precisely bringing about that condition which one was trying to avoid -- namely takeover by a leftist government.

Avery: Well, of course, I don't know the extent to which the United States were involved in this. One used to hear from one's Iranian friends that Americans had been seen in the parts of the prison where these operations -- these interrogations -- took place and so on. But I don't know.

But the point is that in the people's minds the C.I.A. or whatever -- the U.S.A. -- became associated with this particular aspect of the Shah's rule. And this must be borne in mind by anybody who might attempt to explain more recent events.

Q: Also, there is another thing that baffles me -- is that --
I mean, I didn't know the Shah that well. But I had met him a couple times and I know people who knew him reasonably well. And he obviously was on the personal level the kindest, and the most generous of men. I mean, he couldn't bear seeing anybody deprived of anything.

How come that he got himself worked up? I mean, who filled his head with such complexes about leftism and about the communist that he went over his obviously natural tendency to being forgiving and magnanimous?

Avery: I can't say that I knew him.

I think he was a very good actor. I think he was a man who responded probably very vigorously to situations and events, and certainly to threats and certainly to any kind of criticism, unfortunately. He was sensetive to criticism. Because I think essentially he was a rather weak and I think also a man of many complexes due to the circumstances in which he'd grown up.

I think, also, one of his problems was not quite to understand the nature and the wit of the Iranian people. His period you eluded to earlier on -- his being educated in Switzerland -- was probably not to his advantage.

His father, you see, was always able to have some kind of a dialogue with Iranians in a way that the last Shah was not. Reza Shah was an Iranian. Reza Shah knew the Iranians very well indeed. He was very much one of them.

I remember an old mollah I used to meet called Sharafoddin Khorasani -- terrible old man. [chuckles] Sharafoddin Khorasani was one of my assistants at Cambridge. His son -- [chuckles] I remember going to Tehran and meeting the father who had been a very rebellious and noisy mollah against Reza Shah in the old days and still always addressed all his conversation to whomever it might be in his tiny little room. He lived in this tiny, humble little house -- pathetic house that he lived in. He always talked as if he were on the "manbar" addressing a whole mosque full of people -- very loud, vigorous voice.

But I remember the numerous mixed up, tumbling out stories that he used to tell me about his early days and about "Mashrutiyat" and about Moshiroddowleh and Vosuqoddowleh -- all these tales he used to love to tell me.

I remember one tale in which he -- Of course, he knew Reza Shah quite well at the time of the coup d'etat of February 21, 1921 and so on. Then he opposed Reza Shah, of course, when Reza Shah began to oppose the mollahs, on whom Reza Shah had to some extent relied, of course, in getting into power. But you see, the point was that he had conversations with Reza Shah in a way that the last Shah could not have with men of his kind, mollas- "akhunds" like he was.

And describing one of these conversations -- Reza Shah sending for him. And he goes to Reza Shah: "and the Shah "be man goft shoma chera mard-e narahatid? Man behesh goftam man narahat hastam hastam va budam va khaham bud ta moqe'ik-e kasani mesl shoma karetan ra mikonid", and so on, you see.

'Why are you a dissident, a difficult man standing out against us?'

And I said in reply to him, 'I am such a man and I was such a man and I shall be such a man so long as people like you do the sort of things people like you do and so on.'"

This hammer and tongue, give and take shouting dialogue between this old member of the religious classes and the all powerful Reza Shah is a very interesting anecdote illustrating a situation which was totally impossible under the sophisticated, "deracine" Mohmmad Reza

Pahlavi. So far away from all those mollahs and "akhunds" who, God help us now, we see rushing about in bullet proof limousines up and down the streets of Tehran.

Q: Tragedies.

Avery: Of course.

Q: Now, to go back to those early years when you were working for the oil company -- There were certain personalities also connected with the oil company who you obviously met.

There's somebody called Hosein Makki, Mozaffar Baqa'i?

Avery: Baqa'i was the one whose name I was trying to remember, who came from Kerman and who was the founder of the Hezb-e Kargaran -- Baqa'i.

But I met him with people like Sadeq Hedayat and Chubak and the intellectuals.

Q: Was he an intellectual?

Avery: Yes, Baqa'i was. Makki wasn't. Makki was a...

Q: Who was Makki?

Avery: Well, Hosein Makki was a Majles deputy. He had been in the Air Force, originally, as a sort of Private -- not an officer. I think but in the Air Force, originally.

He was very much a product of the Pahlavi era -- clever, adroit, a good writer. He wrote a series of histories of his own times which [are] quite interesting. But he, "n'etait pas un homme cultive". He used to try and claim to be one of the literataire -- one of the circle of people like Baqa'i and Hedayat and those. But he wasn't really one of them at all. But he was a bright and a clever man who came very much to the fore at the time of oil nationalization.

Q: What was his function then?

Avery: He was sent down to Abadan as the representative of the Majles who was to see to the taking over of the oil company.

He later quarreled with Mossadeq.

And there's the famous story -- He met the Shah on an early morning walk in some holiday resort as it were. [chuckles] And there's the speech he made in the Majles, "tasadofan, ettefaqan",

repeating these adverbs: "I happened, by chance, as it were entirely, haphazardly to meet the Shah and we had a conversation."

So he deserted Mossadeq in the end. But he's never come out into the political forefront again. During the 1950s, you remember, he was cited to me as one who might be waiting in the wings to step forward again, which he never has done.

I did meet him once.

Q: He's still alive, you think?

Avery: I'm sure he's still alive.

Q: In Tehran?

Avery: I think he's still in there.

Q: And he works as an historian -- writing books?

Avery: I think he writes and lives.

He made quite a lot of money during his period in power under Mossadeq by -- once the company had been nationalized and its British officials had left -- I think -- I don't know. This is libelous so we should be careful.

Q: No. I mean, nobody --

Avery: But I think he made -- there were stories. His stores got sold in Basrah and elsewhere. They were huge. You know all kinds of stores -- plumbing stores and so on. I don't know.

Anyway, I'll say that Makki lives well (I think) and comfortably.

[tape stopped while speaking]

[end of side one of tape two]

Avery: [tape started after Mr. Avery began speaking]

Hezb-e Kargaran-e Iran, Dr. Baqai's party because I acted as interpreter in an interview that he gave to Reuter correspondent in Abadan.

Hezb-e Kargaran was modeled very much on the British Labor Party. I think Hezb-e Kargaran would have been a better word for it. But he called it the Toiler's Party -- Hezb-e Kargaran. He aimed to model himself on the British Labor Party because unfortunately, perhaps for him, the Reuter correspondent he was being interviewed by had, in fact, been a lifelong member of the British Labor Party [chuckles] and had (before becoming a Reuter correspondent) been a very high editorial official of The_Herald newspaper -- the British Labor Party's former newspaper.

So he asked Dr. Baqa'i some very searching questions. And his remark to me sote vou? privately afterwards was that he didn't think that Dr. Baqa'i knew very much about the British Labor Party, but certainly his aims were ostensibly to have a socialist party that was not, of course, a communist party.

Q: Not pro-Soviet like the Tudeh.

Avery: And certainly not pro-Soviet -- certainly not.

Q: And what happened to his party?

Avery: I think it fizzled out.

Q: Nobody joined it?

Avery: It never got off the ground, unfortunately. Dr. Baqa'i was later exiled to Kerman (I think) in 1954 or sometime like that, and has never really come back into political activism that I know of.

Q: He was a doctor of what?

Avery: He was a doctor of philosophy and taught aesthetics at the university. He was a professor of philosophy.

Q: And he gave that up as well?

Avery: I don't really know what became of him in later life. I never saw him again.

Q: Yes. Any other personalities?

Avery: I never saw him again. I mean I did see him quite a lot of him at one time.

Personalities --

Q: Any other personalities.

Avery: Of course, "Mohandes" Bazargan. I used to see him in Abadan. He came down to Abadan, too -- "Mohandes" Bazargan.

He and I both used to use the same swimming pool very early in the mornings. I used to swim up and down, and he used to swim up and down. He was a very keen on keeping fit sort of man -- very quiet, very charming, very pleasant man, but I think a terribly misled man. A really sort of tragic kind of case of a man who gets religion in rather the wrong kind of way.

Q: Like a disease, as it were.

Avery: Yes. And an aberration.

Q: That's right.

Avery: It's a sort of breakdown of the intellect. It's an intellect that has been confronted by great possibilities for intellectual exercise and development. And somehow, I think eventually takes -- I see it very often among undergraduates and people who are failing. [chuckles] And you know, as they are failing, they take refuge in religions and cult interests and other interests which are good, constructive and which boosts one's morale. But one's prowess as an engineer or whatever it is one's really supposed to be taking an interest in is not necessarily enhanced by this this escape into other channels of activity once, somehow, you've subconsciously realized that the original aspirations you were working on are beyond your reach.

Q: And this is what happened to Bazargan, you think.

Avery: Partly, I think. Yes.

I was looking the other day at a book of his that has just been given to me about the two revolution and how it -- A history of the revolution as he sees it. And it certainly struck me that there is something not quite sound.

Q: But some people say that at the time after the Mossadeq era he could, like everybody else, compromise with the regime and got to places of eminence or at least prominence if he had chosen to. But he chose --

Avery: Oh, I think he was a man of principle. Oh yes. He didn't choose to come into an alliance with the regime.

I think he's a man of principle. I think he's essentially a good and pleasant man and a kind man.

Q: And anybody else -- Dr. Fallah, for instance -- Was he anybody then?

Avery: Oh, yes. He was somebody. Oh, yes -- I had known him for many years.

Q: What was he?

Avery: But, of course, the Fallah I originally knew was the brilliant oil technologist.

We always used to say of him, "He got the highest marks in petroleum technology in his studies at Birmingham University that had ever been got by anybody." You see, he was an absolutely brilliant --

Q: Engineer.

Avery: Engineer. Dr. Reza Fallah was. And it was he who (let it not be forgotten) kept the delicate machinery of the oil refinery and the well heads in the oil fields all in such perfect order that when the oil consortium came back in 1953 and it was possible to reactivate Iran's oil, it was simply a question, really, of turning on the switches again.

Fallah had maintained it all so well that nothing had gone wrong. This complicated mechanism could just be reactivated.

Q: How did he come to be in such a position as what people say now, to become so corrupt financially and to accumulate so much wealth?

Avery: [chuckles] Well, I didn't know anything about that, of course. I don't know. [chuckles]

There's a story that suddenly comes to mind about General Ironside having an audience with Ahmad Shah when General Ironside was sent out to Iran to try and reorganize the military situation there a bit in 1919, 1920. He has audience with Ahmad Shah -- purely informal audience -- which he's rather taken aback. It's in his diaries which are being published in an edited form.

He said he was very surprised when the Shah suddenly asked him whether he could provide transport for carrying gold -- if you please, gold coins for the Shah -- in heavy boxes to the Shah's bank in Baghdad. [chuckles] Of course, the historian of Iran is naturally very interested, so to speak, in nugget information like this that counts.

General Ironside, who's reporting in absolutely cold -- I mean, he obviously didn't see -- He was almost surprised that the Shah wanted to do it at a time when Iran was appalling short of specie -- had no money. And so he was taken aback.

And he said to the Shah, "You're actually sending money out of the country, Your Majesty, at a time when the country seems to need money so much."

And Ahmad Shah replied, "Oui mon general, tout le monde est de temps en temps egoiste."

Well, I'm reminded of that. I don't know anything about how Reza Fallah became, as they say, corrupt et cetera and amassed such amount of money. But I suppose that it's a question of "tout le monde qui vient de temps en temps egoiste".

I was astonished when I was told only a year or two ago as I was being taken out to the extremely luxurious circumstances in which his widow lives for lunch -- near Windsor. And as I was being driven there my Iranian hostess told me that this lady we were going to have lunch with was his widow gets a cent (as it were) on almost every barrel of oil that's moved anywhere in the world. [chuckles]

Q: How did he manage that?

Avery: [chuckles] Well, he was obviously a very great petroleum technologist and he managed to get himself involved (I suppose) in this (I think) rather dirty oil cartel world, you see. It's a national oil world. And he got in so many deals that that is the situation.

Q: Anybody else of that era that you can remember -- personalities?

We can go back to the intellectuals later.

Avery: Manuchehr Eqbal, of course, one saw in slightly later times. But personalities --

See, I never met Mossadeq. I never met a man I'd dearly love to, and that is Qavamossaltaneh. So I can't really --

Q: Did you ever meet that man who was Mossadeq's Foreign Minister, who's name I've forgotten and who was killed afterwards?

Avery: Oh, Hosein Fatemi, oddly enough, I met at the Coronation of King Feysal of Iraq in Baghdad.

Q: What did you think of him?

Avery: He was a very, very excruciatingly bitter and twisted sort of man. I remember he was very offensive when I was introduced to him though we were in somebody else's houses. We were in the Royal Palace of Baghdad. Because at that time, of course, Britain didn't have relations with Iran.

But he looked, nevertheless, quite dignified. He was wearing an order. He was Iran's representative at that Coronation. But he looked very fanatical [chuckles] -- a very fanatical person.

He was eventually torn to pieces, poor man, by the mob. Hosein Fatemi, yes. They were an Esfahani family -- an intellectual family.

Q: Now, so the cultural climate before the oil nationalization and before the Mossadeq fiasco was very liberal, obviously.

Avery: Yes.

Q: There was a tremendous amount of cultural activities going on -- books being published, translations, this, that and the other.

Avery: Yes.

Q: And then, what about -- I mean, the Shah was very interested in culture. I mean, he wanted to be a patron of the arts and sciences and so forth. I mean, he was really interested --

Avery: He might have been interested in culture. I don't know if he knew much about it.

Q: No, but he was interested. He didn't want to go down in history as a king who has suppressed poetry or literature and what have you.

Avery: But he knew nothing about Persian poetry.

Q: What was the climate like afterwards? What do you think of -- the attitude of the regime?

Avery: Well, it became extremely vulgar. And of course, I've talked about one element of the

"boghz." Another element that encouraged the "boghz" -- the antipathy to the regime -- was the extraordinary way in which the Shah and (as Iranians of the time would have said) his American friends or under the guidance of his American counselors rode roughshod over all the ancient and cherished cultural mores of the Iranian state.

The Iranian culture is a medieval culture -- very much interwoven. It's very much an integrated whole. And it's something that is (as it were) woven into the lives of people -- "Farsi shekar ast." Everything is very, somehow, concrete and at the same time abstract. "Farsi shekar ast" -- "Persian is sugar" is the saying. The language is sugar -- our language. Not that our language is sweet; our language is sugar. And then you see an Iranian as one -- My own Iranian assistant -- And then the day before yesterday in this very room I gave him a cup of tea. I gave lump sugar. And he takes a lump out of the bowl and puts it into his mouth and drinks the tea through the lump of sugar, as all ordinary, traditional Iranians do. And this is it -- "Farsi shekar ast". It's sugar on the tongue like that lump of sugar that we put in our mouths and we drink tea.

Now all these things are Iranian. The Shah had nothing to do with these things at all. He was reputed -- it may have been a lie. He was reputed, you see, but it's a very interesting lie. It's a symbolic lie. He was reputed to eat beefsteak. He didn't like rice they said -- rice which is the principle element in any Iranian meal.

I remember being down at Zahedan with the Minister of Roads the night before his arrival. We had to go down there to meet him. He was coming on a tour. Zahedan is a very remote place on the borders of Iran and Pakistan and Baluchistan.

The Governor had us to dinner and said that he was rehearsing to see whether his cook, who once served English people, could do it properly. And would I come and tell them and be perfectly honest? And so we had beefsteak -- beautiful beefsteak. It melted in your mouth. I said, "It's excellent, Your Excellency. It's perfect."

He said, "Will it do?"

I said, "For who?"

"Well," he said, "you see, I wanted to know, Peter, whether it would be all right because he's got to cook this for him."

Oh, him. [Chuckles].

"Tomorrow night."

So I said, "Oh, yes. His Majesty will be very pleased if it's like this." And the cook was sent for. I told the cook, I said, "Shadbash, this is just how it should be."

Then he showed me his bed and asked me whether I could make the bed properly. I said, "What do you mean?"

"Well," he said, "make it because it has to be made like Europeans make a bed, in fact, like English and American people make a bed -- you know, tucked in -- not like Scandinavians."

And of course, nowadays more and more Europeans are, in fact, using the duvet system without tucking it in. Of course, the old Iranian system was the duvet -- the "lahaf" just folded up and then unfolded. And you lay under it on a mattress.

The Shah's bed had to be "farangi" and made a la European, you see. Well, that was all right. I actually saw that that was all right.

And then he opened a cupboard with jars and jars of boiled sweets -- Barker and Dobson's boiled sweets -- and numerous bottles of Gordon's gin. Well, of course, you know, one of the scandals of court life is that the courtiers and the people providing for the court always buy far too much of everything. You know, the "kaseh az ash garmtar hamisheh." [chuckles]

And I said, "What are you going to do, Your Excellency? Are you opening a sweet shop to sell

all these English boiled sweats in Zahedan?" Great big jars and all this gin. "Gin and a sweet shop," I said, "a very peculiar combination. What's all this for?"

He said, "Well, he likes English boiled sweets and he likes gin. So I was told by the Palace to get these in."

Now, this is a silly story, isn't it -- and a very funny story.

Q: No, no.

Avery: But the point is that none of the gentlemen I was with -- the Governor who is of a very distinguished Iranian family -- I won't mention the name, the Minister of Roads who's of a very distinguished Iranian family -- I won't mention the name -- and a devoted servant of the Pahlavis, I may say, both father and son. But you see, to these gentlemen all this was odd because it was not Iranian.

The Shah seemed to have a sort of contempt for his people and for Iranians. And to be so remote from them -- And then his sycophants -- the people who let him down so badly, these dreadful fellows who profited so well from his regime and his scandals -- They, too, were all so "farangi-ma'ab, hamashunja'far Khan as farang bargashteh" types. All of them were so, in a way, contemptuous of the customs and the dignities of their country.

What people don't seem to realize is that there were thirty- five million Iranians. And of those thirty-five million Iranians about thirty-four million were Iranians who did not sleep on beds made in the European fashion, who did not drink Gordon's gin and did not eat beefsteaks and Barker and Dobson's boiled sweets.

What people don't realize is that the westernized, modernized minority in Iran was a minority of not very much more than a million or two million people.

What Khomeini has done in that revolution was to bring out the other thirty-three and a half million.

Q: Yes. But, you see, the point -- Don't you think that it's not an isolated incident? I mean, I'm just putting it to you. And that it is very typical of what we call nowadays "culture shock" which is that the more culture, the more advanced, the more intelligent element to come into contact with western civilation. The western way of life begin to lose the security that their own culture is worth keeping, and develop this kind of inferiority complex.

Avery: Yes.

Q: It shows itself. It is really the contempt for the self much more than the contempt for the other person.

Avery: Yes.

Q: And so that what you really despise (and I could see that) -- Everybody could see that among some of the ruling classes -- Because the Shah was also very patriotic. That paradox -- That's what I'm trying to emphasize -- that he really was very patriotic. He really had a sort of historical vision of himself and of his rule...

Avery: He had to like the country that gave him his job.

Q: He did have all this sort of idealism, as well.

But what I'm saying is that this cultural shock produces the condition in which you doubt your own self, you despise your own self. And if you're in a position of power, this contempt is translated into contempt for others and wanting the things to change so drastically and so quickly into becoming what the masters or the people you are trying to emulate are like, regardless of the fact that the English may be wonderful or the Europeans may be wonderful in some areas, but in others they're just as, you know, deficient and everybody else.

Avery: Well, of course, most of the Iranians -- the rest of the Iranians -- wanted improvements. But I think the improvements should have been taken more slowly and taken more in the way of developing Iran for Iranians -- developing it in an Iranian way instead of in such a -- Of course, Reza Shah, himself, tried to develop it much more in an Iranian way.

Q: Well, you see, I was going back there.

Avery: The foreign influences became so evident after the fall of Mossadeq.

As an Iranian once said to me, he said, "The British used to be very influential in this country before. But now it's the Americans." This was an elderly Iranian who'd been an official, a man of affairs and experience. But he said, "In all my years, I never saw a British official sitting at a desk in a corner of an Iranian official's office. But I see American officials actually sharing offices with Iranian officials. We never had that. The British were certainly behind the scenes very often and very influential indeed, but they never actually came and took up space in our offices. We were not a colonial power to that extent."

The Americans lacked tact and they lacked the kind of appreciation, of course, that many of the old fashioned British officials certainly had for Iranian culture. People like Mr. Allen Trot

and so on, who put into log their conversation with quotations from Hafez, Sa'di, Nezami and Sana'i and so forth. This type of foreigner -- He may have been interfering. He may have been resented. But he did not ride roughshod over the dignity and over the character and over the cherished culture of a whole people in the way that was beginning to seem evident towards the end of the Pahlavi regime.

And when people are becoming frightened because the poor were not getting any improvements (somehow improvements were eluding them), they were at the same time seeing a lot of changes being made to their society and they were becoming confused and frightened. And it's out of that kind of combination of confusion and fear that revolutions happen.

Q: Yes.

Now, setting aside the last ten to fifteen years -- Because there was money from petrol there and there was a goldrush. Of course, everybody rushed -- it was a kind of gold rush from every foreign country into Iran -- to grab some of the spoils.

Setting aside those last few years -- the last decade -- During the whole reign of Pahlavis, it seems to me, looking back at it that there was a tremendous attempt made at the revival of Persian culture.

Avery: Yes.

Q: For instance, the Royal Academy, [of] which my father was one of the founding members, for the Persian language.

Avery: Certainly. And Reza Shah -- Very great strides were made which most Iranians (pro- or

anti-Pahlavi or whatever, leaving that aside) of any intelligence would always acknowledge and have, in fact, pointed out to me the fact that under Reza Shah's reign great improvements were made. Iran was given a new dignity, a new identity, which it had well nigh lost entirely in the nineteenth century, and certainly revived as a national, sovereign entity on the world's stage. This is something that nobody can ever take away from the memory of Reza Shah who was in many ways, of course, a very great man indeed.

No. A lot of very good things were done. In the end it was spoiled.

You asked a little earlier on about personalities. I can, at a later stage, talk about other personalities. I mean, Ebtehaj, for example.

Q: That's right.

Avery: I'd like to talk about people like that.

But I was really thinking of the 1951.

Q: That's right.

Avery: They don't come into my life until 1955, really, when I was in contact with people like them.

Q: But for instance, (what I call) the cultural revival for the language was very important.

Avery: Yes, most [important].

Q: I mean, one of the tasks of the Royal Academy was to find it -- Persian words in Persian literature.

Avery: [chuckles] Don't we know. But, you see, the sense of humor of the Iranians is, you know, unsuppressible. [chuckles]

I hear stories that were told, you see. My old Iranian friends would tell me, "bale inkar ra kardan."

Reza Shah gave orders that you mustn't use Arabic words for thanks -- like "tashshakor" -- of course, Arabic derivatives. [chuckles] "You must use a nice Iranian phrase compound -- "sepasgozar, man sepasgozaram", which I think sounds rather nice. I think it's rather lovely.

Q: It's a wonderful word. [chuckles]

Avery: "Sepasgozar". [chuckles] Of course, it is a made-up word. However, having invented a nice Persian sounding compound both with parts which are certainly derivatives from Iranian languages and discouraged the use of Arabic phrases for thanks -- "What do you end up with?" my Iranian friends used to say.

"Merci."

Q: No, but that also, you know --

Avery: Merci. [chuckles] [inaudible]

Q: That doesn't matter. But there was so much.

Avery: No. A lot of very valuable work was started.

Q: No. People like Sadeq Hedayat or Sadeq Chubak and all the literature that came about and Persian poets like -- What's his name -- the guy who started the new poetry?

Avery: Nima Yushij.

Q: Nima Yushij. And all the people who came after -- It simply would not have happened if one had gone on with that very stultified, stilted, awful, Arabic written language which was prevalent in all the official documents and so on.

Avery: Yes. But I mean, we don't owe the breakthrough from that Arabicized Persian to anything that happened under the Pahlavis. The type Persian that Hedayat and people like that could write was started much earlier. It was started by people like Zeynol'abedin Maraghe'i who wrote the Travel_Diary_of_Ebrahim_Beig published in the early 1900s, closer to 1905 -- that period.

And then Jamalzadeh's famous Yeki_Bud_Yeki_Nabud which came out in 1921 in Berlin. That was earlier than the Pahlavis.

Q: Sure, but it was carried forward. And that was...

Avery: To some extent, yes. But Reza Shah was not -- It is impossible to regard Reza Shah as a patron of literature. It is absolutely impossible. I mean, he --

Q: No. But one can regard him as patron of things Persian, and therefore --

Avery: Because he didn't permit the freedom that art needs to flourish.

The arts began to flourish again on his departure in 1941. That was when you got a great outburst of literary work -- between 1941 and 1951 (that decade).

The famous Writers' Congress that was held under the auspices of the Soviet Embassy during Qavamossaltaneh government in 1946 were very remarkable. I brought the proceedings of the very remarkable --

Q: What was it?

Avery: It was a congress of Iranian writers and a tremendous statement of the aims of literature and keeping Iranian literature alive.

This was after the period under Reza Shah when public expression -- literary expression -- was very heavily guarded, very carefully censored and guarded. Reza Shah's was a a very strong dictatorship.

Then there was this wonderful period I've eluded to of freedom and then the fall of Mossadeq -- still the freedom lasted for a time until, really, after 1963, after the -- [tape stopped while Mr. Avery was still speaking]